New political parties through the voters' eyes 1
Scholars mainly studied the formation of political parties on the macro-level, but to explain the conditions of successful party establishment we need to understand the motivational underpinnings of voting for a new party on the individual level. Using cross-national voter surveys and long-term panel data from Germany (2005 Germany ( -2013 and the Netherlands (1998 Netherlands ( -2002 , this study contrasts the implicit assumptions about voter behaviour of equilibrium-and protest-based theories on party emergence. Although proximity to a new party matters, the findings do not support the equilibrium perspective's tenet that new parties gain votes from citizens whose views were not represented in the preceding election. Moreover, political discontent was found a fertile soil for new parties to gain electoral support, but the relationship between discontent and voting is more complex than theoretically suggested. These findings on individual voter behaviour may inform further theoretical work on the successful establishment of new political parties.
Keywords: Party systems, new parties, Germany, panel data, populism, voting behaviour In the past decades, the establishment of new political parties has reshaped the face of many European party systems (Poguntke 1993; Mudde 2010) . Some scholars interpret the emergence of new parties as a sign for the vitality and responsivity of a party system (Harmel 1985) , but good arguments can also be made that new parties are signs of distress and discontent (Belanger and Nadeau 2005) . Conflicting interpretations about the formation of parties reflect normative premises, but they may also reflect differences in the empirical assessment of the motives that lead citizens to cast their ballot for a new party, thereby enabling its successful establishment. Yet, what drives individual voters to turn their back on established parties and to cast a ballot for new formations has not received much scholarly attention.
The literature on party emergence focuses on the macro-level, employing political parties or party systems as observational units (Selb and Pituctin 2010) . Studies in this tradition assess the role of institutional factors or long-term social trends and provide insights into the specific attributes of newly emerged parties (e.g., Bolleyer 2013; Hug 2001; Lago and Martínez 2011; Tavits 2006) . Because party establishment is by definition tied to electoral accomplishments (Hino 2012) , macro-level studies on successful party establishment explicitly, or implicitly, presuppose assumptions about the behaviour of individual citizens whose votes are necessary for electoral success.
2 Electoral research on the individual level has accumulated much knowledge about the motivational underpinnings of the voting calculus, including vote choices for recently emerged party families (e.g., anti-immigrant parties, see : Bélanger and Aarts 2006; Norris 2005; Fennema et al. 2000) . However, because those studies do not investigate new parties as such, micro-level research aiming to enhance our understanding of party formation is scarce. This study combines macro-level explanations of party emergence with theories on voting behaviour and observes attitudinal changes on the micro-level as a reaction to the emergence of new political parties. By investigating individual determinants of voting for new parties, this study contributes to an ongoing controversy about the conditions of party emergence, namely about whether empty ideological spaces are necessary requirements for the establishment of a new party or whether it suffices for a party to channel and express diffuse dissatisfaction as a project of 'newness'.
Using cross-national voter surveys and Dutch and German long-term panel data this study shows that there are merits to both approaches, but in many cases, the individual-level 2 Macro-level studies (e.g., Hug 2000) distinguish the emergence of new political parties from their success as distinct stages of party formation. Due to the empirical focus on voting behavior, this study necessarily includes only political parties that have successfully overcome the requirements for electoral participation. When I speak of 'emergence', for the sake of simplicity, it is with this restriction in mind.
assumptions of both models do not square with the observed voting behaviour. More specifically, the findings underscore the role of political discontent in the decision to vote for a new party, but they do not provide evidence for the protest-based perspective of dissatisfied voters who would float like sand drift from one new party to the next. Likewise, the data underscore the role of proximity considerations in the calculations of (some) voters to cast their ballot for a new party, but the results do not provide evidence for the equilibrium approach's depiction of new party voters as lonesome wanderers in the policy space. These results have implications for macro-level theories on the emergence of political parties that are discussed in the concluding section.
Macro-und micro-level explanations of party emergence
Stability and fluidity of party systems have been subject to extensive scholarly work (e.g., Sartori 1977) . For long, scholars viewed party systems as dynamic equilibria of issue preferences, in which new parties would surface to counterbalance disturbances when the congruence between voters and parties had become too loose (Laver 2005; Sartori 1977) . From this perspective, political issues are the electoral market's primary goods, and party competition is explained by policy demands of the electorate on the one hand and policy offerings of political parties on the other hand. Changes in the electorate's demands are understood as external shocks that require policy adjustments on the part of political parties. If the established parties fail to adjust accordingly, opportunities for the formation of new parties will open up.
Scholars in this tradition, therefore, 'know that new parties emerge primarily because old parties have failed to absorb new issues into their agenda and programmes ' (Müller-Rommel 2002: 740) . This classic line of reasoning has for long been influential in party research and also permeates recent scholarly debates. The burgeoning literature on niche parties, for instance, enhances and refines our understanding of the role of political issues in the emergence of new parties (Ezrow 2008; Abou-Chadi 2016) . Still, it is the common notion of these studies that niche parties owe their emergence to distinct characteristics of their programmatic offerings (Meyer and Miller 2015; Zons 2016) . Hence, when explaining the emergence of new parties, scholars often view the electoral market as an equilibrium between the electorate's demands for and the parties' supply of certain issue proposals.
Nonetheless, scholars of late have contemplated the possibility that new parties might emerge without filling empty policy spaces or propagating new political topics. Empirically, several cases of new populist or anti-establishment parties were documented whose support is driven by factors seemingly different from ideology or specific issues (Barr 2009 ).
Theoretically, scholars reasoned about alternative pathways of party emergence. Lucardie (2000) proposed that political parties might enter the political competition as purifiers of already existing ideologies. Observing political parties that achieve parliamentary presence without supplying novel programmatic ideas, Sikk (2011) suggested that new political alliances could build their electoral offer solely on a 'project of newness'. Devoid of particular policy innovations, such parties could capitalize on anti-establishment resentments among segments of the electorate, so that the sole promise of being different from seemingly failed options of the past could be the distinctive feature of a new party.
The discrepancies between these macro-level perspectives are rooted in diverging assumptions about the voter calculus. Because macro-level studies of party emergence rarely specify assumptions about voter motivation, we need to uncover the individual-level assumptions of both approaches in order to understand under which conditions political parties can succeed as new electoral contestants. Examining the establishment of new parties on the micro-level requires us to view new political parties from the voters' eyes. Even though we may or may not be able to objectively measure the macro-level contextual characteristics which influence the emergence of new parties (e.g., the distribution of party positions in the policy spaces), for investigations on the individual level we need to employ the subjective interpretations of the reality that voters hold. These interpretations might be contradictory or arguably false but they are nonetheless the basis of individual decisions. How voters then incorporate these beliefs in their decision-making processes is conceptualized differently by the competing macro-level theories on party emergence (Table 1) .
The equilibrium perspective employs a Downsian conception of voting in uni-or multidimensional policy spaces (Laver 2005) . Only if citizens care about policies and base their party choice on specific issues or their ideological generalizations, it is reasonable to explain the emergence of new parties as the result of an interplay between policy demands and policy offerings.
[ Table 1 near here.]
From the protest-based perspective on new party establishment, voting serves an expressive rather than an instrumental function. The potential of protest-based voting is underscored by studies which show substantial erosion of public trust in the representatives of the political system (Norris 2011) . Therefore, the reservoir of anti-partyist resentment among segments of the electorate could form a fertile soil for new electoral competitors (Barr 2009; Belanger and Nadeau 2005; Niedermayer 2010) as new parties may capitalize on a wide-spread populist temperament, which contrasts 'the pure people' on the one hand with 'the corrupt elite' on the other hand (Mudde 2010) . From this perspective, the electoral appeal of new political parties is their ability to credibly claim pureness for not being part of the disdained elites.
In order to better understand the rivalling conceptions of voter behaviour that we deducted from macro-level approaches to party emergence, we can borrow from a parallel discussion in electoral studies: the literature on vote switching (Schoen 2003 According to the latter and more optimistic approach, vote switchers make up their minds all over again at each election (Dalton 2007) . In contrast to habitual partisans, vote switchers are viewed as engaging in sophisticated party-related decision-making, considering the parties' prior performance and policy offerings in their vote choices (Dassonneville et al. 2015; van der Meer et al. 2015) . The positive perspective on vote switching comprises the implicit micro-level assumptions of the equilibrium accounts on party emergence: voters care about policies, and new political parties will enter the party system by attracting citizens whose political views are not represented by the established parties. Likewise, the equilibrium approach assumes that voters of new parties consider issue stances of the parties when making voting decisions. Empirically, however, the majority of citizens do not consider proximity calculations in their voting decisions (Boatright 2008; Lenz 2012; Singh 2010 In the literature on vote switching, the more sceptical approach describes floating voters as similar to sand drift (Zelle 1995; Dassonneville 2012; Belanger and Nadeau 2005) . Because voting is not seen as choosing the best fit out of a menu of distinct policy options but as a vehicle to express dissatisfaction, discontent vote switchers would be swayed from one party to the 
Method and Operationalization
Main dependent variable is whether a respondent has voted for a new party. We define a new political party as a political organisation that has not competed for office before on the national level with the same name. The identification of new political parties in the CSES dataset was carried out using the CSES codebook and additional publicly available information (see appendix A1). For an empirical test of the dissatisfaction hypothesis, we employ two indicators: the perceived efficacy of voting is a more specific indicator of discontent, reflecting attitudes towards the act of voting as the perennial institution of democratic systems. Efficacy of voting was assessed on a 5-point scale on whether it makes a big difference whom people vote for. voter's self-placement and the voter's perception of the position of the party he or she voted for on an 11-point left-right scale. Finally, testing the indifference hypothesis relies on the degree to which individuals like or dislike the party they voted for (11-point scale), which represents a generalized summary evaluation of the party. In order to minimize unobserved heterogeneity, socio-demographic and attitudinal covariates are included in the model which are known to be fairly stable over time and located early in the funnel of causality.
Empirical Analysis
Although the equilibrium-and the protest-based perspectives on new party emergence hold diverging premises on the differences between voters of new parties and the rest of the electorate, both approaches concur that new party voters can be characterized by distinct features, on which new political parties build electoral success. Using CSES data, the first analytic step, therefore, examines whether the proclivity to vote for a new party goes along with distinct voter characteristics.
[ Table 2 about here] Table 2 reports the results of a logistic regression on the proclivity to cast a vote for a party that had not previously competed in national elections. 8 Clustered standard errors account for similarities of individuals in the same electoral context. 9 To make the results easier to comprehend, I report average marginal effects using the observed value approach (Hanmer and Ozan Kalkan 2013) .
The regression model contains two indicators of political dissatisfaction to investigate the prevalence of political discontent among supporters of new parties. Perceived efficacy of voting is not associated with the proclivity to vote for a new party but generalized political alienation is more prevalent among new party voters than among other voters. In line with the protest-based approach, higher levels of dissatisfaction with democracy go along with a higher propensity to vote for a new party. The average probability to vote for new parties across all elections in the sample is 18.1 per cent. Increasing generalized dissatisfaction by one standard deviation increases the probability to vote for a new party by three percentage points, indicating a substantial but small effect. 10 Hence, the data confirm the expected relationship between political dissatisfaction and voting for new parties even though the association is not strong.
If voters seek to signal protest and to use their ballot expressively, then we expect a lower weight of party-related considerations when voters decide for a new party over the established alternatives. In contrast to the indifference hypothesis, however, vote choice evaluations do not predict whether a person cast the ballot for a new or an established political party. In other 8 Due to the high frequency of missing values in party-related indicators in some countries (see Appendix A3), the analysis was re-ran without these variables but the results do not differ substantively (see Appendix A4). 9 See Appendix 5 for robustness analyses using multi-level modelling. 10 Increasing political dissatisfaction from the minimum to the maximum increases the probability to vote for a new party by 12.6 percentage points (see Appendix A6 for distributions of the variable).
words, the appraisal of the party that a respondent voted for is equally important for voters of new parties as it is for other voters. Hence, the analysis does not provide evidence for the idea that new party voters are swayed to any political alternative regardless of the characteristics of that new party.
Ideological proximities are used to test whether the assumptions derived from the equilibrium approach embody a better approximation of the observed voter behaviour.
Considering the importance of political spaces that the equilibrium approach attributes to the decision calculus of new party voters, this approach predicts that new party voters would be ideologically closer to their vote choices than voters who stayed with established political
parties. Yet, Table 2 shows that ideological proximity is not a distinct feature of new party voters as the degree of ideological congruence makes no difference in the inclination to cast a ballot for a new party.
Altogether, the analysis of the international survey data solely lends support for the dissatisfaction hypothesis whereas the observed voting behaviour does not conform to the remaining hypotheses. However, the lack of significant results might be a methodological artefact of averaging effects across a diverse set of countries. To avoid overlooking meaningful effects in single elections, we conducted separate logistic regressions for each of the 39 electoral contests (Figure 1 , covariates not plotted).
[ Although supporters of new political parties are not ideologically closer to their vote choice in virtually any observed electoral contest, proponents of the equilibrium model could 11 Considering the great variation in effects of political dissatisfaction across elections, post-hoc exploratory analyses were conducted to investigate potential contextual moderators of dissatisfaction's influence in a country. Because the likelihood of new party emergence depends on the distribution of political dissatisfaction in a society (Tavits 2008) , it was tested whether the overall level of dissatisfaction in a country moderates the relationship between new party voting and a person's level of dissatisfaction but there is no evidence for a crosslevel interaction (see appendix A7 To investigate the merits of these methodological objections, we turn to Dutch and German long-term panel surveys. These longitudinal datasets span two or more elections, thus enable to disentangle the temporal order of system-level dynamics among the parties and individual-level changes in attitudes about the parties (see Table 3 for an overview of the distribution of new party voters in the respective datasets).
[ Table 3 In contrast to the indifference hypothesis, Table 3 with their previous vote choice, adherents of new political parties did not achieve higher congruence with their parties after the reconfiguration of the party system than other voters. combined in the meta-analysis (Appendix 10), the estimates are precise enough to conclude that new party voters achieve lower switching benefits than ordinary vote switchers. Substantively, in terms of ideological congruence, this finding suggests that it would not have made a large difference if new party voters had stayed with their previous vote choice. In other words, contradicting the equilibrium-model, voters of new parties have abandoned established parties in favour of new parties even though they do not gain significant benefit in ideological proximity.
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Because unidimensional policy orientations might not sufficiently represent the political space, I employed different strategies to test the results' sensitivity to using left-right placements. First, an additional analysis of the German data makes use of a different indicator of perceived representation by the political parties. Individual perceptions of the parties' competence to solve the country's most important problems serves as a measure of partyrelated alienation. Specifically, this indicator queries whether a respondent reports that none of the available parties can solve the country's most or second-most pressing problem. Employing this strategy circumvents researcher assumptions about the probable weight of specific issues in the voting calculus and about the representation of these policy preferences in a generalized ideological super-issue. Moreover, it takes into account that issue importance varies between voters. Hence, we investigate voter evaluations of the parties' political supply in terms of the voters' subjective perception of the issue agenda.
According to the equilibrium account, we would expect higher levels of party-related alienation among new party voters before the emergence of the new electoral alternative and, presumably, a certain degree of reconciliation after the new party has accommodated the voters' previously unrepresented political preferences. However, as Table 4 shows, most new party voters did not feel alienated from the political parties before the establishment of the new party.
Moreover, although the estimates for new party voters are subject to considerable uncertainty, clearly only a minority of new party voters exhibit improvements in self-reported alienation with the political parties. Finally, we observe similar trajectories of party-related alienation among all groups of voters. Therefore, a measure which does not rely on narrow assumptions about the voters' belief system also does not provide much evidence for the basic tenet of the equilibrium account that political parties appeal to voters who previously felt unsatisfied with the political offerings of the established parties.
[ Table 4 about here]
For another test of the equilibrium hypothesis in a different context, the analysis of voter-party congruence over time is replicated using Dutch data, which has the advantage of providing party-related survey measures on multiple policy issues. Figure 3 Altogether, however, these findings caution us not to expect these models to represent voter behaviour in every electoral contest adequately, but they emphasize the variety of reasons and considerations that stipulate vote choices for a new party, depending on party characteristics and other contextual factors.
This study argued for the relevance of linking macro-level explanations of party formation to empirical examinations of individual-level processes. However, studying individual vote choices requires survey data that come with certain analytical limitations, which also apply to this study. First, the analyses are confined to the measures in each survey. Partyrelated evaluations are usually only queried for major parties. Hence, then analytical leverage of survey data does not cover the entire universe of new parties and is restricted to the more successful challengers. In addition, most election surveys such as the CSES only measure perceptions of party positions on the left-right scale. In interpreting these analyses, therefore, we should keep in mind that this generalized super-issue does not represent the entire policy space, which is why several efforts were made to diversify the analyses in the longitudinal analyses on Germany and the Netherlands. Second, the generalizability is confined to time and countries for which survey data is available. For instance, much literature on new political parties considers the formation of green parties, supposedly as a response to growing demands from the electorate along the new politics dimension. Since many Green parties were founded before the first CSES survey wave (1996) , this study cannot speak to the development before that point in time. Moreover, the data on long-term voting histories is confined to five recent electoral contests in two countries. Even though the new parties in these elections propagates different issues (digital freedom, euro-scepticism, anti-immigration) and differed in how they tapped into political frustration among voters, none of these parties were, for example, spinoffs from existing parties by prominent politicians, which might employ more issue-based appeals instead of anti-establishment rhetoric.
While the findings of this study provide insights into the motivation of new party voters, it can only be a stepping-stone for further empirical and theoretical work. In addition to studies on new parties from the voters' perspective, more theoretical work on party emergence is called for, which incorporates evidence on voter behaviour into macrolevel explanations. For example, Zons (2016) showed that programmatic distinctiveness is more important for the success of niche parties at the beginning of the life cycle, but the importance fades over time. Zons employed an equilibrium perspective, but the findings could be reinterpreted as indicating that programmatic distinction not (only) matters for instrumental reasons (to maximize congruence) but also for expressive reasons (as a signal of newness). In this vein, understanding the motives of new party voters on the individual level may contribute to the theoretical integration of equilibrium-and protest-based approaches to party emergence.
For instance, among the findings of the present study was that political discontent and attitudes towards the acceptance of asylum seekers both played a role in vote choices for Lijst Pim Fortuyn in the Dutch 2002 elections. As individuals may well be driven by different motivations simultaneously (Bélanger and Aarts 2006) , the equilibrium-and the protest-based approach are neither exhaustive nor necessarily mutually exclusive which might be elaborated in future studies. 
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